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The extent to which new technological knowledge flows across institutional and national
boundaries is a question of great importance for public policy and the modeling of economic growth,
This paper develops a model of the process generating subsequent citations to patents as a lens for
viewing knowledge diffusion. We find that the probability of patent citation over time after a patent
is granted fits well to a double-exponential function that can be interpreted as the mixture of
diffusion and obsolescence functions, The results indicate that diffusion is geographically localized.
Controlling for other factors, within-country citations are more numerous and come more quickly














The rate at which knowledge diffuses outward from the institutional setting and
geographic location in which it is created has important implications for the modelling of
technological change and economic growth, and for science and technology policy. Models of
endogenous economic growth, such asRomer(1990) or Grossman and Helpman (199 1), typically
treat knowledge as completely diffused within an economy, but implicitly or explicitly assume
that knowledge does not diffuse across economies. In the policy arena, ultimate economic
benefits are increasingly seen as the primary policy motivation for public support of scientific
research, Obviously, the economic benefits to the U.S. economy of domestic research depend
on the fruits of that research being more emily or more quickly harvested by domestic firms than
by foreign firms. Thus for both modeling and policy-making purposes it is crucial to understand
the institutional, geographic and temporal dimensions of the spread of newly created knowledge.
In a previous paper with Rebecca Henderson (Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993)
we explored the extent to which citations by patents to previous patents are geographically
Iocdized, relative to a baseline likelihood of localization based on the predetermined pattern of
technological activity. This paper extends that work in several important dimensions. First, we
use a much larger number of patents over a much longer period of time, This allows us to
explicitly introduce time, and hence diffusion, into the citation process. Second, we enrich the
institutional comparisons we can make by looking at 3 distinct sources of potentially cited
patents: U.S. corporations, U.S. universities and the U.S. government. Third, the larger number
of patents allows us to enrich the geographic portrait by examining separately the diffusion of
knowledge from U.S. institutions to inventors in Canada, Europe, Japan and the rest of the world.
Finally, our earlier work took the act of citation as exogenous, and simply measured how often
that citation came from nearby. In this paper we develop a modelling framework that allows the
generation of citations from multiple distinct locations to be generated by a random process
whose parameters we estimate.
II. THE DATA
We are in the process of collecting from commercial sources a complete database on allU.S. patents’ granted since 1963 (approximately 2.5 million patents), including data for each
indicating the nature of the organization if any, to which the patent property right was assigned;2
the names of the inventors and the organization, if any to which the patent right ww resigned;
the residence of each inventor;3 the date of the patent application and the patent grant;’ a detailed
technological classification for the patent; and miscellaneous other information. The data on
individual patents are complemented by a file indicating all of the citations made by U.S. patents
since 1977 to previous U,S. patents (approximately 9 million citations). Using the citation
information in conjunction with the detailed information about each patent itself, we have an
extremely rich mine of information about individual inventive acts and the links among them as
indicated by citations made by a given patent to a previous one.
We have discussed elsewhere at great length the advantages and disadvantages of using
patents and patent citations to indicate inventions and knowledge links among inventions (Jtie,
Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993; Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe, 1992; See also Griliches,
1990), Patent citations perform the legal function of delimiting the patent right by identi~ing
previous patents whose technological scope is explicitly placed outside the bounds of the citing
patent. Hence the appearance of a citation indicates that the cited patent is, in some sense, a
technological antecedent of the citing patent. Patent applicants bear a legal obligation to disclose
any knowledge that they might have of relevant prior inventions, and the patent examiner may
also add citations not identified by the applicant.
Our basic goal in this paper is to explore the process by which citations to a given patent
arrive over time, how this process is affected by characteristics of the cited patent, and how
different potentially citing locations differ in the speed and extent to which they “pick up”
1. By “U.S. patents,” we mean in this context patents granted by the U.S. patent office. All of our research
relies on U.S. patents in this sense. Currently about half of U.S. patents are granted to foreigners. Hence, later
in the paper, we will use the phrase “U.S. patents” to mean patents granted to residents of the U. S., as opposed
to those granted to foreigners.
2. Patents are reported as unassigned, or else assigned to one of U.S. corporation, non-U.S. corporation, U.S.
individual, non-U. S. individual, U.S. govemrnent, non-U. S. government.
3. city and state for U.S. inventors, country for non-U.S. inventors
4. We have data only on successful patent applications. Unsuccessful applications are not public information,
2etisting knowledge, as evidenced by their acknowledgement of such existing knowledge through
citation. Because of the policy context mentioned above, we are particularly interested in
citations to university and government patents. We recognize that much of the research that goes
on at both universities and government laboratories never results in patents, and presumably has
impacts that cannot be traced via our patent-citations-bwed research. We believe, however, that
at least with respect to relatively near-term economic impacts, patents and their citations are at
least a useful window into the otherwise “black box” of the spread of scientific and technical
knowledge.
The analysis in this paper is based on the citations made to 3 distinct sets of “potentially
cited” patents. The first set is a 1-in-10 random sample of all patents granted between 1963 and
1990 and assigned to U.S. corporations (88,257 patents). The second set is the universe of all
patents granted between 1965 and 1990 to U.S. Urtiversities, based on a set of assignees identified
by the Patent OffIce as being universities or related entities such as teaching hospitals (10,761
patents),’ The third set is the universe of patents granted between 1963 and 1990 to the U.S.
government (38,254 patents), Based on comparisons with numbers published by NSF, these are
overwhelmingly coming from federal labs, and the bulk come from the large federd labs. The
U.S. government set also includes, however, small numbers of patents from diverse parts of the
federal government. We have identified all patents granted between 1977 and 1993 that cite arty
of the patents in these three sets (479,861 citing patents). Thus we are using temporal,
institutional, geographic and technological information on over 600,000 patents over about 30
years.
Some simple statistics from these data are presented in Table One. On average, university
patents are more highly cited, despite the fact that more of them are recent.b Federal patents are
fess highly cited than corporate patents. But it is difficult to know how to interpret these
averages, because many different effects all contribute to these means. First, the differences in
timing are important, because we know from other work that the overall rate of citation has been
5. There are, presumably university patents before 1965, but we do not have the ability to identi& them as
such.
6. IO previous work (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1995), we showed that university patents applied for up
until about 1982 where more highly cited than corporate patents, but that the difference has since disappeared,
3rising over time (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993), so more recent patents will tend to be more highly
cited than older ones. Semnd, there Me significant differences in the composition of the
different groups by technical field. Most dramaticdly, university patents are much more highly
concentrated in Drugs and Medical Technology, and less concentrated in Mechanical Technology,
than the other groups. Conversely, the federal patents are much more wncentrated in Electronics,
Optics and Nuclear Technology than either of the other groups, with less focus on Chemicals.
To the extent that citation practices vary across fields, differences in citation intensities by type
of institution could be due to field effects. Finally, as shown in Table Two, different potentially
citing locations have different field focuses of their own, with Japan more likely to cite
Electronics patents and less likely to cite Drug and Medical patents. The main contribution of
this paper is the exploration of sn empirical framework in which all of these different effects can
be sorted out, at least in principle.
III. THE MODEL
We seek a flexible descriptive model of the random processes underlying the generation
of citations, which will allow us to estimate parameters of the diffusion process while controlling
for variations over time and technological fields in the “propensity to cite.” For this purpose we
adapt the formulation of Caballero and Jaffe (1993), in which the likelihood that any particular
patent K granted in year T will cite some particular patent k granted in year t is assumed to be
determined by the combination of an exponential process by which knowledge diffuses and a
second exponential process by which knowledge becomes obsolete. That is:
Aw=a(m’P[-P,(m(~-~)l[l -xP(-P,(~-~))1 (1)
where J3,determines the rate of obsolescence and ~z determines the rate of diffusion. We refer
to the likelihood determined by Equation (1) as the “citation frequency,” and the citation
frequency as a function of the citation lag (T-t) as a citation fuction, The dependence of the
parameters a and ~1 on k and K is meant to indicate that these could be functions of certain
attributes of both the cited and citing patents. In this paper, we consider the following as
attributes of the cited patent k that might affect its citation frequency: t, the grant year of the
potentially cited patent; i=l ..3, the institutional nature of the assignee of the potentially cited
4patent (corporate, university or government); and ~1 ..5, the technological field of the potentially
cited patent. As attributes of the potentially citing patent K that might affect the citation
likelihood we consider: T, the grant year of the potentially citing patent, and L=l ..5, the location
of the potentially citing patent.
To illustrate the plausibility of this formulation, we plot the average citation fmctions
(citation frequency as a function of time elapsed from the potentially cited patent), for each of
the 5 geographic regions (Figure One) and each of the 3 institutional groups (Figure Two).’
These figures show that citations show a pattern of gradual diffusion and ultimate obsolescence,
with maximal citation frequency occurring after about 5 years. The contrasts across groups and
countries in these raw averages are striking: U.S. patents are much more likely to cite our 3
groups of U.S. patents than are any other locations, with an apparent ranking among other regions
of Canad% “Rest of World,” E,E,C., and then Japan. Figure Two shows that universities are
much more highly cited than corporations, at least up until lags of about 20 years, and federal
labs are less highly cited throughout. While many of these contrasts will survive more careful
scrutiny, it is important at this point to note that these comparisons do not control for time or
technical field effects, In ptiicular, the coutry comparisons are distorted by differences in
technical field focus, and the university/corporate comparison is distorted by differences in
timing. me relatively high frequencies associated with the longest lags are also distorted by the
fact that these long lags can only be observed for the most recent citing years, and the intensity
of citations made is higher in these years than earlier in the data.
Additional insight into this parmeterization of the diffusion process can be gained by
determining the lag at which the citation function is maximized (“the modal lag”), and the
maximum value of the citation frequency achieved. A little calculus shows that the modal lag
is approximately equal to 1/~1 ; increases in ~, shift the citation fuction to the left. The
maximum value of the citation frequency is approximately determined by ~z/~l ; increases in ~2
holding ~1 constant increase the overall citation intensity.g Indeed, increases in ~z , holding
7. For convenience, we will refer to the citation frequency as a function of citation lag as a ‘citation function. ”
8. The approximation involved is that log(l + ~~~1)= ~J~, , Our estimations all lead to ~+~1 on the order
of 104, and indeed the approximation holds to 5 significant figures for lags up to 30 years.
5~, constant are very close to equivalent to increasing the citation frequency proportionately at
every value of (T-t). That is, variations in ~z , holding ~, constant are not separately identified
from variations in a. Hence because the model is somewhat easier to estimate and interpret with
variations in q we do not allow variations in ~z .
Consider now a potentially cited patent with particular i,t,g attributes, e.g. a university
patent in the Drug and Medical area granted in 1985. The expected number of citations that this
patent will receive from a p~icular T,L combination (e.g. Japanese patents granted in 1993) is
just the above likelihood, as a fmction of i,t,g,T and L, times the number of patents in the
particular T,L group that are thereby potential citing patents. Even aggregating in this way over
T and L, this is still a very small expected value, and so it is not efficient to carry out estimation
at the level of the individual potentially cited patent. Instead we aggregate across all patents in
a particular i,t,g cell, counting all of the citations received by, e.g., university drug patents
granted in 1985, given by, e.g., Japanese patents in 1993, The expected value of this total is just
the expected value for any one potentially cited patent, times the number of potentially cited







implying that the equation
can be estimated by non-linear least squares if the error e~i~~is well-behaved, The data set
consists of one observation for each fewible combination of values of i,t,g,T and L, The
corporate and federal data each contribute 9275 observations (5 values of g times 5 values of L
times 28 values of t times either 17 (for years before 1977) or 1993-t (for years beginning in1977) values of T.g Because the university patents start only in 1965, there are only 8425
university cells, for a total number of observations of 26,975. Of these, about 25°/0 have zero
citations ;’” the mean number of citations is about 18 and the maximum is 737. The mean value
of P*TL is 3.3x104.
Iv. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND INTERPRETATION
The first specification issue to consider is the difficulty of estimating effects associated
with cited year, citing year ad lag. This is analogous to estimating “vintage,” time, and age
effects in a wage model or a hedonic price model. If lag (our “age” effect) entered the model
linearly, then it would be impossible to estimate all three effects, Given that lag enters our model
non-linearly, all three effects are identified, in principle. In practice, we found that we could not
get the model to converge with the double-exponential lag fuction and separate a parameters
for each cited year and each citing year. We were, however, able to estimate a model in which
cited years are grouped into 5 year-internals. Hence we assume that a(t) is constant over t for
these intervals, but allow the intervals to differ from each other.
All of the estimation is carried out including a “base” value for ~1 md ~2, with all other
effects estimated relative to a base value of unity. 11 The various different effects are included
by entering multiplicative parameters, so that tie estimating equation looks like:
(5)
where i=c,u,f (cited institution type); t= 1963-1990 (cited year) tp=l ....6 (five year intervals for
cited year, except first interval is 1963-65); g=l ....5 (technological field of cited patent);
T=1977... 1993 (citing year); and L=l ....5 (citing region). In this model, unlike the linear case,
9. We exclude cells for which t=T, where the model predicts that the number of citations is identically zero. In
fact, the number of citations in such cells is almost always zero.
10. About two-tids of the zero citation observations are for cells associated with either Canada or Rest of
World.
11. As noted above, a is not separately identified from ~1 and ~2. Hence we do not estimate a “base” value
for the parameter a, it is implicitly unity.
7the null hypothesis of no effect corresponds to parameter values of unity rather than zero. For
each effect, one group is omitted from estimation, ie. its multiplicative parameter is constrained
to unity. Thus the parameter values are interpreted as relative to that base group. The base
group for each effect is w follows:
Cited time period (tp) 1963-65
Cited field (g) “All Other”
Type of Cited Institution (i) Corporate
Citing year (T) 1977
Citing region (L) Us.
The estimate of any particular a(k), say a(g=Drugs and Medical), is a proportionality
factor measuring the extent to which the patents in the field “Drugs and Medical” are more or
less likely to be cited over time v-is a vis patents in the base catego~ “AI] Other.” Thus, an
estimate of a(k=Drugs) = 1.4 means that the likelihood that a patent in the field of Drugs and
Medical will receive a citation is 40% higher than the likelihood of a patent in the base category,
controlling of course for a wide range of factors. Notice that this is true across all lags; we can
think of an a greater than unity as meaning that the citation fimction is shifted upward
proportionately, relative to the base group Hence the integral over time (i.e. the total number
of citations per patent) will also be 40°4 larger.
We can think of the overall rate of citation intensity measured by variations in a to be
composed of two parts, Citation intensity is the product of the “fertility” (Caballero and Jaffe,
1993) of the underlying ideas in spawning future technological developments,12 ~d the average
“size” of a patent, i.e. how much of the unobservable advance of knowledge is packaged in a
typical patent. Within the formulation of this paper, it is not possible to decompose the a-effects
12. The “fertility” label for differences in the likelihood of citations is just evocative language suggesting that
cited patents can be thought as “giving birth” to ftier technological developments, or as providing the grounds
on which such subsequent applications grow. ‘Importance” is a term that we have used in this context in
previous work, and refers to the fact that patents that collect more citations over time are deemed on that basis
to be more “important”, Since differences in a are time-independent, the integral over time would also be higher
or lower by the same factor, and hence the equivalence with this notion of “importance.”
8into these two components. 13
In the c=e of a(K), that is, when the multiplicative factor varies with attributes of the
cifing patents, variations in it should be interpreted as differences in the “propensity to cite” (or
in the probability of making a citation) of patents in a particular category vis a vis the base
category of the citing patents. If, for example, a(K=Europe) is 0.5, this means that the average
patent granted to European inventors is half as likely as a patent granted to inventors residing in
the US to cite any given US patent.
Variations in ~1 (again, by attributes of either the cited or the citing patents) imply
differences in the rate of decay or “obsolescence” across categories of patents. Higher values of
~1 mean higher rates of decay, which pull the citations function downwards and leftward. In
other words, the likelihood of citations would be lower everywhere for higher ~1‘s, and would
peak earlier on. Thus a higher a means more citations at all lags; a lower ~1 means more
citations at later lags.
When both a(k, K) and ~1(k, K) vary, the citation function can shift upward at some
lags while shifting downward at others. For example, if a(g=Electronics) = 2.00, but
~l(g=Electronics) = 1.29, then patents in electronics have a very high likelihood of citations
relative to the bme category, but they also become obsolete faster. Because obsolescence is
compounded over time, differences in ~1 eventually result in large differences in the citation
frequency. If we compute the ratio of the likelihood of citations for patents in electronics relative
to those in “all other” using these parameters, we find that 1 year after being granted patents in
electronics are 89°/0 more likely to be cited, but 12 years down the road the frequencies for the
two groups are about the same, and at a lag of 20 years Electronics patents are actually 36°A less
likely to be cited than patents in the base category.
v. RESULTS
5.1 Benchmark results
Table 3 shows results for a “benchmark” specification where we allow a to vary but hold
13. Caballero and Jaffe (1993) attempt to identi& the size of patents by allowing exponential obsolescence to
be a function of accumulated patents rather than elapsed calendar time. We intend to explore this possibility in
future work.
9~1 constant. We carry out all estimation weighting the observations by nn=(ng,*n,,)**0.5, the
square root of the product of the number of potentially cited and potentially citing patents
corresponding to the cell. This weighting scheme should take care of possible heteroskedasticity,
since the observations correspond essentially to “grouped data”, that is, each observation is an
average (in the corresponding cell), computed by dividing the number of citations by (nQi*nti).14
The parameters for the citing years (~), show a clear upward trend, reaching a peak in
1989, with a slight decline thereafter. The estimates imply that citations made per patent,
mntrolling for other factors, was twice as high in 1989 as in 1977.’5 This reflects a well known
institutional phenomenon, namely, the increasing propensity to make citations at the patent office,
apparently associated with the computerization of the patent file and of the operations of patent
examiners. Thus, these coefficients serve strictly as controls, and as very important ones for that
matter, given the magnitude of the changes over time. Without these controls, obsolescence
would appear to be much slower (since our only observations on long lags come from recent
citing years), and foreign countries would appear to make more citations (relative to U.S.), since
the foreign share of patents has increased dramatically over the time period.
Turning to the effects of the cited time period, because we include interaction effects
between the cited period and the source institution (discussed below), the “pure” cited time period
estimates in Table 3 correspond to variations in a over cited year for the base group of corporate
patents. The citations received by this group, as implied by the parameter estimates, declined
steadily, relative to the normalized value of unity in the base period 1963-65, to 0.65 in 1981-85,
somewhat recovering in 1986-90 to 0.73. As discussed above, this means either that idem
underlying corporate patents declined in fertility, that the average “package size” of corporate
patents fell, or both.
The number of patents granted per dollar of R&D fell from the 1960s through the mid-
1980s, recovering slightly since then. Because of this, it is typically assumed that patents have,
14. The qualitative results are essentially the same if we run an unweighed model, or if we weight just by ~.
Weighting increases the fit of the regression dramatically, suggesting that the model does not fit very well for
those cells with few potentially citing patents, which frequently produce zero citations,
15. This difference is even greater than the raw change in average citations per patent, which is an increase by
about 60°/0.
10in some sense, been getting “bigger” rather than smaller, at least until the mid- 1980s, In and of
itself, this would tend to cause our ~ to rise up until the mid-1980s, and perhaps fall after that.
Since what we found was the exact opposite, it seems unlikely that our results are due to chages
in the “size” of patents. Hence they suggest that “fertility” fell from the 1960s until the mid
1980s, with a mild recovery thereafter. While we would not push this very hard, this
interpretation of our results would be consistent with a technology-driven slowdown in
productivity in the 1970s and early 1980s.16
The variations in a by technological fields indicate that patents in Drugs and Medical and
in Electronics are 36-40°/0 more likely to be cited than in other fields. In addition to the fertility
and patent-size effects discussed above, it may also be the cme that differences across fields stem
in part from variations in citation practices (of the patentees and/or of the patent examiners)
across fields. As we shall see in the next section, the results of the model where ~1 is also
allowed to vary by field are more telling, and correspond quite closely to what is known about
these fields. Thus, there is reason to believe that the findings here do reflect real differences
across fields, but that the fixity of ~1 does not allow for the full picture to emerge.
We turn now to the parameters associated with institutional vmiations, starting with
universities. Ignoring 1965,17 we see that university patents became increasingly more “fertile”
than corporate ones in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, but their relative citation intensity declined
in the late 1980’s. We have previously gotten similar results using a model that did not explicitly
deal with the time path of citations (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1994).1’ Government
patents, on the other hand, are significantly less fertile than corporate patents at each of the
16. If the base period reached further back (say into the 1950’s), and if we could observe a longer period of
“recovery” of fertility post-1985, then one could argue perhaps that the drop in “fertility” during the 1970’s and
1980’s was associated with the transition between different “general purpose technologies.” As it is this remains
only a conjecture that camot be substantiated with these data.
17. We have university patents starting only in 1965, not in 1963, and there were a very small number of such
patents that year. Not surprisingly, the university effect for the first cited time period is estimated with relatively
little precision.
18. OrI the other hand, the earlier paper utilized a much finer set of technology field controls, at the level of
about 400 distinct patent classes.
11sub-periods, with a moderate upward trend overtime in their relative citation intensity (from 72°/0
of mntemporaneous corporate in 1963-66 to 75°A in 1981-85), except for a decline in the last
period. Their overall lower fertility level may be due to the fact that these labs had been
traditionally quite isolated from mainstream commercial innovations, and thus those innovations
that they did choose to patent were in some sense marginal. By the same token the upward trend
in the fertility ratio may be due to the increasing “openness” of federd labs, and their efforts to
reach out and make their innovations more commercially oriented. However, for the time being,
and until we gather additional evidence, this interpretation must be regarded as conjectural.
The region coefficients show very significant “localization” effects. That is, US patents
are much more likely to cite previous US patents than are patents granted to inventors of other
countries. Furthermore, the extent to which patents granted to foreign residents are likely to cite
US patents seems to depend upon a metric of geographic and cultural proximity: Canada is
highest with a coefficient of 0.65, followed by Europe with 0.5, and Japan with 0.44. (The fifth
category, ROW, contains a small number of patents from a large number of other countries, and
hence it is difficult to interpret.)
Thus these data do not support the claim that Japan is particularly apt at exploiting
technological advances made in the US (as has been often suggested), In fact, patents granted
to Japanese inventors are less than half as likely to make citations to US patents than patents
granted to U.S. residents. Once again, if we interpret a citation as an indication that the citing
patent “builds upon” the cited patent (or as evidence of a spillover from the cited to the citing
patent), then our results indicate that, at least in the realm of patented inventions, Japanese
inventors draw from US inventions much less than do U.S. residents. 19
Finally, the estimate of ~1 = 0.2 means that the citation functions reaches its maximum
at about 5 years. This estimate is not surprising, given the empirical citation distributions shown
in Figures One and Two. The R2 of 0.52 is fairly high for models of this kind, suggesting that
the postulated double exponential combined with the effects that we have identified fit the data
19. From a purely statistical perspective, one cannot rule out the interpretation that Japanese inventors rely on
U.S. inventions as much as their U.S. counterparts, but somehow manage to avoid citing them, Since the
examiners are the ultimate arbiters of what citations appear on the patents, this would require that U,S, patent
examiners are differentially lax in their duties vis Avis Japanese inventors, This seems unlikely.
12reasonably well.20
5.2 The Full Model:
We present in
Allowing ~1 to vary
Table 4 the results from the estimation of the full model, including
variations in ~1. We discuss below each set of results sepmately,2]
Technofo&”caf Fief& In addition to the multiplicative factor, a~, we allow now for
variations in ~1 according to the technological field of the cited patent. Thus, for example, field
3, Electronics, Optics and Nuclear technology has a coefficient a(g=3) = 2.00, meaning that
patents in this field are likely to get twice as many citations as in the base field “All Other”, and
70-88% more than in the four other fields. However, its ~1 is 30% higher than that of the base,
which means that the rate of citations to these patents decays faster than for others, and thus the
initial “citation advantage” fades quickly over time.
The effect of allowing these joint variations in a and ~1 is shown graphically in Figure
Three. This Figure shows the predicted citation function for potentially cited patents in the
Electronics, Optics and Nuclear Technology field. The Figure shows that both models yield
parameters that predict a greater overall rate of citation of these patents than the base group.
Allowing ~1 to vary shows, however, that this greater overall citation intensity is not uniform
over time. These patents are much more highly cited in the first few years, but also show faster
obsolescence, so that in later years they are actually less highly cited than the base group.
Figure Four shows the citation functions for each of the Technological Fields. Because
the relative frequencies are difficult to see on the graph at higher lags, Part (A) of Table Five
also gives the value of the ratio of the citation probability of each of the technological fields to
the citation probability of the base field, at different lags, i.e. 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 years after the
granting of the cited patents. Looking once again at Electronics, we see that the ratio starts
indeed very high, 1.89, but after 12 years it is the same as the base field, after 20 years it
20. It is interesting that the fit of the unweighed model is considerably poorer, with an R2 of about 15 percent.
Recall that there are a significant number of observations with zero observed citition frequency, for which the
model canot tit for plausible parame~r values. These observations correspond, however, to cells with few
potentially cited and/or citing patents, and hence they get reduced weight in the weighted regression, thus
improving the overall fit.
21. The results for cited time period and citing year are virtually the same as for the benchmark model and
hence are excluded from the Table and not discussed here.
13declines to 0.64, and further down to 0.36 after 30 years. This implies that this field is extremely
dynamic, with a great deal of “action” in the form of follow-up developments taking place during
the first few years after an innovation, but also with a ve~ high obsolescence rate: a decade
down the road the wave of further advances that built upon the original innovation subsides and
is not very different from what happens in most other fields (it is even lower than in Drugs and
Medical). Thirty years later citations have virtually ceased, relative to the rate in some other
fields. Commonly held perceptions about the technological dynamism of this field are thus
amply confirmed by these results, and given a precise quantitative expression.
For other fields the results are perhaps less dramatic but still interesting. Drugs and
Medical starts off at 133Y0,of the base citation frequency, but due to the low obsolescence rate
it grows over time (at a slow pace), so that 10 years later it stands at 150°/0, and 20 years down
the road it has grown to over 170% relative to the base field, and more than that relative to all
other fields. The conjecture here is’that due to the long lead times in pharmaceutical research,
including the process of getting approval from the FDA, follow up developments are slow in
coming. In other words, whereas in Electronics a given innovation has very little impact 10-2O
years later because the field is evolving so fast, in pharmaceuticals a new drug may prompt
follow-up innovations much later, after its medical and commercial viability have been
established.
As to the Chemical field, we see that it starts off at 127% of the base field, but due to
a high obsolescence rate the advantage fades over time (though not as fast as in Electronics),
falling behind the base field in less than a decade. The Mechanical field is similar to the base
field, slowing loosing ground over time. Note that after 20 years the ranking of fields changes
dramatically compared to the ranking at the beginning. In all, we see that these results present
a much more complex picture than having just multiplicative factors for fields, and that there is
a great deal to learn from them, beyond serving just as controls.
Location. The most interesting result in this context, beyond those already discussed in
the benchmark model, is that all foreign countries except Japan have significantly lower ~1’s
than the US. The interpretation of a lower ~1 for a category of the citing patents is that their
propensity to cite (i.e. to “absorb spillovers”) increases over time relative to patents in the base
14category. In the present context this means that the localization effects that we found, m reflected
in the lower a’s for foreign countries, fade over time.22 As shown in Figure Five, the citation
rates for European and Canadian patents eventually catch up to those for U.S. patents. That is,
at first the spillovers from USpatents flow mostly to inventors residing in the US: the probability
that a foreign inventor would cite a patent of a U.S.inventor is 42-56% lower than that of a
US-resident inventor 1 year after grant. However, the relative citation probabilities for foreign
inventors grow over time (due to the lower ~1’s for foreign countries), so that 20 years down the
line the difference has shrunk to 20-36Y0. This is not true of Japan: the “receptiveness” of
Japanese inventors to US inventions remains low, 56% lower than that of U.S. inventors, and
tier a while significantly lower even than that of other foreign inventors.
This “fading” effect in the geographic dimension corresponds to the intuitive notion that
knowledge eventually diffuses evenly across geographic (and other, such as institutional)
boundaries, and that any initial “local” advantage in that sense will eventually dissipate. Once
again, these results offer a quantitative idea of the extent of the initial localization, and the speed
of fading.
Institutional Type The results in this context do not change much vis a vis the
benchmark model: the a’s for universities are slightly lower for most periods relative to the
model with a fixed ~1, while a slightly smaller ~1(U) compensates for that to some extent. The
same holds for government patents, but the change for them is more significant. In fact, the
upward trend is now significantly steeper, with the citation intensity relative to contemporaneous
corporate going from 0.59 in 1963-66 to 0.68 in 1981-85, then declining then slightly to 0.66
in the last period. Figure Six shows the citation functions for selected university and federal
cohorts; the picture shows that the government inferiority gradually fades away. This can also
be seen in Table 5.C, but it takes thirty years for the government citation rate to completely
catch up.
22. We have anticipated this result, in a cruder way and only for a small sample of patents, in Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson, (1993). Notice that here we discuss only localization effects at the national level,
However, the data would permit analogous analysis at lower levels of geographic aggregation.
15VI. CONCLUSION
The computerization of patent citations data provides an exciting opportunity to examine
the links among inventions and inventors, over time, space, technology and institutions. The
ability to look at very large numbers of patents and citations allows us to begin to decompose
overall citation flows in ways that better reflect reality. This paper represents an initial
exploration of these data. Many variations that we have not explored are possible, but this initial
foray provides some intriguing results, First, we confirm our earlier results on the geographic
localization of citations, but now provide a much more compelling picture of the process of
diffusion of citations around the world over time, Second, we find that federal government
patents are significantly less cited than corporate patents, although they do have somewhat greater
“staying power” over time. Third, we confirm our earlier findings regarding the importance or
fertility of university patents. Interestingly, we do not find that university patents are, to any
significant extent, more likely to be cited after long periods of time. Finally, we show that
citation patterns across technological fields conform to prior beliefs about the pace of innovation
and the significance of “gestation” lags in different areas, with Electronics, Optics and Nuclear
Technology showing very high early citation but rapid obsolescence, while Drugs and Medical
Technology generates significant citations for a very long time.
The list of additional questions that could be examined with these data and this kind of
model is even longer. First, it would be interesting to examine if the geographic localization
differs across the corporate, university and federal cited samples. Second, the interpretation that
we give to the geographic results could be strengthened by examining patents granted in the U.S.
to foreign corporations. Our interpretation suggests that the lower citation rate for foreign
inventors should not hold for this group of cited patents. Third, we could apply a similar model
to geographic regions within the U.S., although some experimentation will be necessary to
determine how small such regions can be and still yield reasonably large numbers of citations in
each cell while controlling for other effects. Fourth, it would be useful to confirm the robustness
of these results to finer technological distinctions, although our previous work with citations data
lead us to believe that this will not make a big difference. Finally, we would like to investigate
the feasibility of modelling obsolescence as a function of accumulated patents. Caballero and
16Jaffe (1993) implemented this approach, but in that analysis patents were not distinguished by
location or technological field.
17Caballero, Ricardo J. and Adam B. Jaffe (1993), “How High are the Giants’ Shoulders: An
Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model
of Economic Growth,” in Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, eds, NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press
Griliches, Zvi (1990), “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Jouma) of
Economic Literature 92:630-653
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1991), “Quality Ladders in the Theory of
Growth,” Quarteri’y Journal of Economics, 106;557-586
Jaffe, Adam B., Rebecca Henderson and Manuel Trajtenberg (1993), “Geographic
Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 108:577-598
Krugman, Paul (1991), Geographv and Trade, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press
Romer, Paul M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy
98: S71-S102
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18TABLE ONE
Summary Statistics by Institutional Subsample
Range of Cited Patents
Range of Citing Patents





Percent Cited Patents by Field
Drugs & Medical
Chemical exc.Drugs
Electronics, Optics & Nuclear
Mechanical
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Weighted Non-linear Least Squares Estimation of Base Model























Technological Field Effects (Bas&’’All Other”)
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Electronics, Optics and Nuclear
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26,975 observations; R-squar~.5 161























































































Weighted Non-linear Least Squares Estimation of Model with Va@g Betal
Parameter -ptotic t-statistic for
Standard Error ~: paramete~l
Technological Field Effects (Bas&’’All Other”)
Drugs and Medical 1,308
Chemicals Exe, Drugs 1.308
Electronics, Optics and Nuclear 2,003
Mechanical 1.120




Rest of World 0.434
















Betal Multipliers by Technological Field (Base is “MI Other”)
Drugs and Medical 0.932
Chemicals Exe, Drugs 1.158
Electronics, Optics and Nuclear 1,288
Mechanical 1,054
Betal Multipliers by Cited Institution Class (Base is Corporate)
University 0,978
Federd Govermnent 0.932






































































Estimation also inclu&d cited time period and citing year effects as in Table Three,
*t-statistic is for ~: parameter==TABLE FIVE
(A) Citation Probability Ratio by Technological Field
Betal Lag
Technological Field Multiplier 1 5 10 20 30
DRUGS & MEDICAL 0.932 1.33 1,40 1.50 1.71 1,96
CHEMICAL 1.158 1.27 1,12 0.96 0,70 0,51
ELECTRONICS ETC. 1.288 1.89 1.50 1.13 0,64 0.36
MECHANICAL 1.054 1,11 1.06 1.01 0.91 0,81
OTHER 1.000 1,00 1.00 1,00 1,00 1.00
(B) Citation Probability Ratio by Geographic Area
Betal Lag
Location Multiplier 1 5 10 20 30
CANADA 0.914 0,58 0.62 0.67 0,80 0.95
EUROPE 0.899 0.44 0,48 0.53 0.65 0.79
JAPAN 1.002 0.44 0,44 0.44 0,44 0.44
REST OF WORLD 0,900 0.44 0.48 0.53 0,64 0.78
us 1,000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1,00
(C) Citation Probability Ratio by Institution
Betal Lag
Research Institution Multiplier 1 5 10 20 30
UNIVERSITIES 1981-1985 0.978 1,23 1.25 1,28 1.34 1.40
UNIVERSITIES 1986-1990 0.978 1.08 1.10 1.12 1,18 1.23
FEDERAL LABS 1981-1985 0.932 0.69 0,73 0.78 0.90 1.03
FEDERAL LABS 1986-1990 0.932 0.67 0.70 0.75 0,86 0.99
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